ABSTRACT Fog computing enables computation, storage, applications, and network services between the Internet of Things and the cloud servers by extending the Cloud Computing paradigm to the edge of the network. When protecting information security in Fog computing, advanced security with low latency, wide-spread geographical distribution support, and high flexibility should be taken in to considertion first, because of its huge number of nodes. In this paper, we propose a new cryptographic primitive, named CCA2 secure publicly-verifiable revocable large-universe multi-authority attribute-based encryption (CCA2-PV-R-LU-MA-ABE), to achieve flexible fine-grained access control in Fog computing. In this primitive, end nodes in fogs generate private keys from multiple authorities that might be differentiated by their geographical locations or functions, and their attributes can be denoted by any strings in the large universe, which meets diverse needs in practical Fog applications. In addition, the accessibility of nodes can be revoked efficiently even by resource-limited devices. To ensure the validity of ciphertext, this primitive supports public verification and only valid ciphertext can be stored or transmitted. Based on the primitive and the feature of Fog computing, we construct a concrete CCA2-PV-R-LU-MA-ABE scheme. We define the security model of this primitive, which is much more secure than the CPA-secure scheme. Finally, we compare the efficiency of the proposed concrete scheme with that of the existing CPA-secure scheme by both theoretical and experimental analysis, and the results show that the extra consumption of efficiency to improving CPA to CCA2 is considerably low. The proposed scheme is highly secure, flexible, and efficient enough to be deployed in practical Fog computing.
applied to Fogs directly, considering efficiency and security level.
Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) [2] is a suitable cryptosystem to achieve fine-grained access control. Users generate private keys corresponding to their attributes from an authority. Data owners can encrypt data according to the target recipients' attributes without knowing their exact identities, then only someone satisfying requested attributes can get access to the message. However, end-user devices in Fogs are distributed geographically, which is different from centralized Cloud, and sensors in Fogs have all kinds of attributes. Apparently, billions of end nodes with different attributes from their geographically isolated Fogs get private keys from a centralized attribute authority cannot meet the Fogs' requirement, especially in efficiency [3] . Besides, attributes might be various and expressed as all kinds of strings. Thus the attribute universe should be large enough to make the system flexible.
Then many large-universe multi-authority ABE (LU-MA-ABE) schemes was proposed to make ABE more flexible, while these scheme are constructed based on composite-order bilinear groups, which have unsatisfactory computational efficiency. Recently, Rouselakis and Waters [4] proposed an efficient LU-MA-ABE on prime-order bilinear groups, and it has great flexibility and efficiency. However, the scheme is only statically secure against chosen plaintext attack (CPA) that weaker than semantic security against chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA2). In traditional way, one-time signature is applied to improve CPA security to CCA2 at the cost of much more operation time. How to improve the efficient CPA-secure LU-MA-ABE to CCA2-secure LU-MA-ABE at the expense of smaller efficiency losses is a difficult problem to be solved urgently. For the limited source of end nodes, tampered or illegally encrypted message would cause a meaningless latency to Fogs, in which case a public verification mechanism is really needed to filter it.
In addition, the huge number of nodes in Fogs poses a problem for management. Once one of the billions of nodes leaks its private key, behaves illegally or its attributes change, the authority should revoke its private key. In the existing LU-MA-ABE scheme, the authorities has to update keys for all unrevoked nodes one by one, or perform complex calculations to unrevoked nodes, which will sharply reduce the efficiency of Fogs or increase energy consumption of devices in practice. In summary, an efficient LU-MA-ABE with CCA2 security supporting efficient private-key revocation should be presented to achieve efficient, secure and practical fine-grained access control in Fog Computing.
A. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
We propose a new efficient CCA2-PV-LU-MA-ABE system for Fog Computing based on an earlier version [5] of this paper presented at the international conference, Cyberspace Safety and Security -9th International Symposium [6] , in which CCA2 secure is more secure than the exiting CPA secure ABE scheme and we add to it the function of public verification. The proposed system supports multiple authority and large-universe attributes to make the access control more flexible. Besides, this system supports public verification of ciphertext to ensure its validity, where without knowing the decryption keys, the Fogs and all end nodes can verify the validation of the ciphertext, i.e., the ciphertext is encrypted by the declared attributes and has not been tampered. This verification procedure prevents useless data from occupying storage space, which can be efficiently computed by fogs. This system satisfies the functionality, security and efficiency needs of fine-grained access control in Fog Computing.
We define the security notion of this system named indistinguishability against selective authority and access policy and statically chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-sAA-sCCA2). In this security notion, the challenger plays a security game with an adversary. At the beginning of the game, the adversary should declare the access policy and a set of corrupted authority that it will attack. Then the adversary plays a statically CCA2 security game with the challenger, but it cannot distinguish the encrypted message with a more than negligible probability.
Based on system model and security notion, we construct a concrete CCA2 secure PV-R-LU-MA-ABE scheme on prime-order groups. We use the subset-cover revocation framework to make the attribute revocable, and it reduces the number of executions in updating keys from linearly to logarithmically correlate with the number of end nodes. After revocation, the Fogs only need to re-encrypt the corresponding part of ciphertext to prevent end nodes with revoked attribute cannot get access to the data. To satisfy the CCA2 security need of the security notion, we use the Chameleon hash function, and we treat the hash value of the ciphertext as an on-the-fly dummy attribute. Then we use the hash-value attribute to encrypt the message and get a new part of ciphertext to make sure the ciphertext tamper-resistant. And the challenger can use the trapdoor of the Chameleon hash to complete the simulation of CCA2 security game.
Finally, we prove the proposed CCA2-PV-R-LU-MA-ABE scheme is IND-sAA-sCCA2 secure and we analysis the efficiency of this scheme. Above all, the CCA2-PV-R-LU-MA-ABE can satisfy almost all of the functionality, security and efficiency needs of Fog Computing, and thus it would get practical deployment in Fogs.
B. RELATED WORK
Fog Computing was proposed to enable data processing at the edge of the Cloud [7] . Since then, a lot of research on fog computing has been studied [8] - [11] . Hong et al. [12] proposed the mobile fog to achieve large-scale applications on the Internet of Things. Then Stojmenovic and Wen [13] and Stojmenovic et al. [14] introduced the scenarios and security issues of Fog Computing, and they studied the CPU and memory consumption on Fog devices when a man-inthe-middle attack happens. Jiang et al. [15] proposed a traceable ciphertext-policy ABE scheme in Fog Computing and it provides protections against the key-delegation abuse issue. Zhang et al. [16] proposed CP-ABE scheme with outsourcing capability and attribute update for fog computing.
Sahai and Waters [2] first introduced ABE, and then keypolicy ABE (KP-ABE) was proposed by Goyal et al. [17] and ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE) was proposed by Bethencourt et al. [18] . In KP-ABE, secret keys are associated with access policy and ciphertexts are associated with attributes. In CP-ABE the ciphertexts are associated with access policy and secret keys are associated with attributes. To enhance the security, many ABE scheme was proposed [19] - [22] . Okamoto and Takashima [23] and Lewko et al. [24] proposed fully secure ABE constructions in standard model. MA-ABE was proposed by Chase [3] and it has been improved in both efficiency and security [25] - [29] .
LU-ABE was proposed by Lewko et al. based on composite-order bilinear groups [30] and prime-order bilinear groups [31] . Rouselakis and Waters [32] proposed LU-ABE with selective security in standard model. Key revocation of ABE is constructed in direct and indirect methods [33] . Beimel et al. [34] proposed the revocable KP-ABE in the indirect method by updating keys. Sahai et al. [35] proposed the revocable ABE scheme by updating keys and ciphertext. And Tsuchida et al. [36] came up with the CPA secure revocable MA-ABE scheme.
To achieve CCA2 secure ABE scheme, Canetti et al. [37] proposed the approach that CPA-secure KP-ABE in [17] can be converted to CCA2-secure KP-ABE. Yamada et al. [38] proposed a generic construction that can transform ABE scheme from CPA security to CCA2 security, if the ABE scheme satisfies delegatability or verifiability. The above conversion approach is with the help of one-time signatures. Chen et al. [39] and Ge et al. [40] constructed ABE schemes without one-time signature, but the limitation of these scheme is that only threshold access policies are supported. Recently, Liu et al. [41] proposed CCA2-secure KP-ABE based on the Chameleon hash function.
C. ORGANIZATION
Necessary preliminaries are introduced for RHIBBE in Section II, including notations, the prime-order bilinear groups, the q-DPBDHE2 problem and assumption, access structures and linear secret sharing schemes, Chameleon hash function, and subset-cover revocation framework. Then the CCA2-PV-R-LU-MA-ABE system definition is presented in Section III, where the security notion IND-sAA-sCCA2 are described. Based on all of the above, a concrete CCA2-PV-R-LU-MA-ABE scheme is constructed in Section IV. Then the security of the scheme is analyzed in Section V and the proposed concrete scheme is IND-sAA-sCCA2 secure. In Section VI, the performance of the scheme is analyzed with both theoretical and experimental methods, which shows this system is suit for real deployment in Fog Computing to provide highly secure fine-grained access control. Finally, we give a future implementation example in Blockchain in Section VII and the proposed scheme would be efficiently deployed in blockchain-based distributed storage system.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. NOTATIONS
CCA2-PV-R-LU-MA-ABE is a new cryptographic primitive for fog computing. To describe it much better, we introduce several notations in this paper. Table 1 summarizes these notations and their corresponding meanings.
We use [n] to denote {1, 2, . . . , n}, and |S| to denote the cardinality of the set S. And s R ← − S denotes that s is uniformly chosen at random from S. Besides, we use Z m×n p to denote a matrix with m rows and n columns elements in Z p . The inner product of two vectors is denoted as − → v · − → ω .
B. BILINEAR GROUPS AND COMPUTATIONAL ASSUMPTION
Let p be a large prime, and G and G T be two cyclic groups of order p. If g is a generator of G, and e : G × G → G T is a bilinear map, we say that G and G T are bilinear groups if e satisfies all of the properties:
Let G and G T be bilinear groups with order p, e : G × G → G T , and let g be a generator of the group G. Pick
Given the tuple (D, e(g, g) sa q+1 ) or (D, R), an algorithm B outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1}. We define that B has advantage in solving q-DPBDHE2 problem if
where the probability is over the random choice of s, a, b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b q ∈ Z p , g ∈ G, R ∈ G T and random bits used in B. 2) q-DPBDHE2 Assumption.
The q-DPBDHE2 assumption holds in G if there is no algorithm that has advantage at least in solving the (t, , q)-DPBDHE2 problem in polynomial time t.
C. CHAMELEON HASH
In this paper, we use the Chameleon hash function to help prove the security of the concrete scheme. In the Chameleon hash function, there are three algorithms and only the one knowing the secret key can find collisions for its inputs.
• KeyGen ch (1 λ ) → (SK ch , PK ch ): This algorithm takes the security parameter λ ∈ N as input and then outputs the secret key and the public key.
• H ch (PK ch , M , r ch ) → V : This algorithm takes the public key PK ch , the message M and an auxiliary parameter r ch as input and then outputs the hash value V .
• UForge ch (SK ch , M , r ch , M ) → r ch : This algorithm takes the secret key SK ch , a message M with its auxiliary parameter r ch and a new message M as input and then outputs a new auxiliary parameter r ch such that the hash value of M with r ch is equal to the hash value of M with r ch , i.e., H ch (PK ch , M , r ch ) = H ch (PK ch , M , r ch ). Besides, a Chameleon hash function should satisfy the security requirements including collision resistance and uniformity. The collision resistance means that, for a Chameleon hash public key PK ch , there is no efficient algorithm that can find two pairs (M , r ch ), (M , r ch ) where M = M , such that H ch (PK ch , M , r ch ) = H ch (PK ch , M , r ch ) except negligible probability. And the uniformity means that all messages M induce the same probability distribution on H ch (PK ch , M , r ch ) → V where r ch is uniformly chosen at random.
D. SUBSET-COVER REVOCATION FRAMEWORK
Naor et al. [42] proposed the subset-cover revocation framework, in which the Complete Subtree (CS) method and Subset Difference (SD) methods are two instances. Based on CS method, we realize the revocation in this paper. The binary tree of CS method is described as the Figure 1 shows [43] .
On input a binary tree BT , the current time T , and a revocation list RL, the algorithm outputs a set of users which has not been revoked until time T . What's more important, this set allows to update keys for the least nodes, which is logarithmic in the number of users. In the binary tree BT , each user is assigned as a leaf node of the binary tree, and the intermediate nodes of the binary tree are virtual points. Let v denote a non-leaf node and v L (v R ) denote the left (right) child of v. Path(v i ) denotes all the nodes that are on the path from v i to the root. If the user GID is revoked on time T i , GID, T i will be added into the revocation list RL. For the current time T , the binary tree BT and the revocation list RL the KUNode(BT , RL, T ) function is defined as follows:
To take an example, if there are four users θ 4 , θ 5 , θ 6 , θ 7 issued by the authority θ 1 , the revocation list RL = ∅ and the user θ 4 in Figure 1 is revoked currently, θ 4 would be added into RL = {θ 4 }. The result of KUNode(BT , RL, T ) would be Y = {θ 5 , θ 3 }.
III. CCA2-PV-R-LU-MA-ABE A. SYSTEM MODEL
There are five roles in this system, named the Cloud, Fogs, authorities, data owners and data visitors as described in Figure 2 . The Cloud can complete traditional cloud computing missions, and there are many Fogs at the edge of the Cloud. Each Fog can manage lightweight computing missions for its local end nodes, including all kinds of sensors and devices. The Fogs are treated as a semi-trusted server in this scheme, which means the Fogs cannot get the data plaintext, but they should store the ciphertext and verify its validity, and re-encrypt the related ciphertext when the authorities update keys to data visitors. When a sensor collects and uploads data to the Fog, we treat the sensor as a data owner. And when a device runs some application that requests data from the Fog, we treat the device as a data visitor.
The Cloud sets up this system and declares system parameters. And in each Fog some authorities set up to generate attribute-related keys for nodes. The data visitor can query for secret keys to the authorities that is corresponding to their attributes. Before the data owners upload data to the Fog, they would decide the attributes that the data visitors should have to get access to such data, and they encrypt the data by the required access policy. When the Fog gets the ciphertext, it can verify the validation of the ciphertext without decryption or knowing any secret key, and only if the ciphertext is encrypted by declared attributes and not tampered, it can be transmitted in this Fog. If the data visitor's attributes satisfy the data's access policy, they can decrypt the ciphertext and get the data. Besides, if some data visitor's attribute is revoked, the secret key corresponding to this attribute will be revoked by the authority, and the Fog would get the revocation list and re-encrypt the ciphertext to prevent revoked users from decrypting it. To realize aforementioned functionality, this system consists of nine polynomial time algorithms defined as follows.
• Setup(1 λ ) → Param: This algorithm is run by the Cloud to set up the system. It takes security parameter as input and outputs the system parameters for Fogs.
• ASetup(θ) → (PK θ , SK θ ): This algorithm is run by decentralized authorities to set up authority's public key and private key. It takes the authority's identity as input and then the authority publishes the public key and keeps the private key secretly.
• KeyGen(GID, θ, att, SK θ ) → SK GID,att :This algorithm is run by authority to generate private keys. It takes the data visitor's identity GID, its attribute att and the authority's private key as input, and outputs the data visitor's private key.
• KeyUp(BT θ , RL) → {KU θ,N }: This algorithm is run by each authority to update private keys to all attributeunrevoked data visitors. It takes the revocation list and a binary tree as input, and outputs the updated re-encryption part of private keys. The updated part is published to the unrevoked data visitors and the Fog.
• RKGen({KN θ,N }, {KU θ,N }) → RK θ / ⊥: This algorithm is run by the Fog and unrevoked data visitors to get the updated re-encryption keys. It takes {KU θ,N } and {KN θ,N } as input and outputs the updated re-encryption keys.
• Enc(M , (A, δ), {PK θ }) → C: This algorithm is run by data owner to encrypt message with corresponding access policy. It takes the message with its access policy and the public key of related authorities as input, and outputs the ciphertext.
• Verify(C, (A, δ)) → True/False: The algorithm can be run publicly to verify the validation of ciphertext, and normally it is run by the Fog. It takes in the ciphertext and the access policy, and outputs True if the ciphertext is valid.
• ReEnc(C, RK att ) → C : This algorithm is run by the Fog to re-encrypt the ciphertext to prevent revoked users from decrypting it.
• Dec(C , RK θ , {SK GID,att }) → M / ⊥: This algorithm is run by the data visitor to decrypt. If the data visitor does not satisfy the access policy or some of its corresponding attributes have been revoked, it cannot get the plaintext correctly.
• Rev(GID, att, RL) → RL: This algorithm is run by the authority to add the revoked user's identity GID with attribute att to the revocation list.
B. SECURITY MODEL
We define the security model for CCA2-PV-R-LU-MA-ABE, named indistinguishability against selective authority and access policy and statically chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-sAA-sCCA2). At the beginning of this security model, the adversary should claim the access policy that it will challenge in the challenge phase, and it should also claim the corrupt authorities. The challenge message must be encrypted by at least one attribute from honest authority, and attributes from some of these corrupt authorities can also be used to encrypt the challenge message, which means in real condition if only part of the encrypted attributes are from corrupted authorities, the ciphertext still cannot be attacked successfully. Let = {Setup, ASetup, KeyGen, KeyUp, RKGen, Enc, Verify, ReEnc, Dec} denote this CCA2-PV-R-LU-MA-ABE system. Formally, we define the IND-sAA-sCCA2 security model for fog computing through the game played between adversary A and challenger B.
Init. Adversary A should select a challenge access policy (A * , δ * ) and a set of corrupt authorities C θ at the beginning of the game. Then A sends them to B.
Setup. B sets up the system and sends public parameter Param to A.
Phase1. A issues following queries statically:
• ASetup(·, ·) Queries: A outputs a set of non-corrupted authorities and B sets up the queried authorities.
• KeyGen(·, ·, ·, ·) Queries: A makes secret key queries for users with a set of its all attributes, and B generates secret keys to A. If the queried attributes set satisfies the selected challenge access policy, we require A has to revoke one of these attributes from all users.
• Rev(·, ·, ·) Queries: A queries to revoke some users with certain attribute. B adds the identity and attribute into the revocation list, and updates keys to all unrevoked users, then we require Re-Encryption should be queried to re-encrypt the ciphertext with the latest re-encryption keys.
• ReEnc(·, ·) Queries: A makes re-encryption queries, then B runs the RKGen algorithm to get the latest re-encryption keys and takes it as input to run the ReEnc algorithm to get the re-encrypted ciphertext.
• Dec(·, ·, ·) Queries: A makes decryption queries for ciphertext with access policy. Then B generates private keys for such access policy and decrypts to respond to A.
Challenge. A submits to B two messages M 0 , M 1 with equal length. Then B randomly flips coin b ∈ {0, 1} and encrypts M b with the selected access policy (A * , δ * ). The ciphertext should be re-encrypted by the latest re-encryption keys, and then be returned to A.
Phase2. It is the same as in Phase1 except that A cannot make KeyGen(·, ·, ·, ·) for the selected access policy or Dec(·, ·, ·) query for the challenge ciphertext.
Guess. Finally, A outputs a guess b ∈ {0, 1}. A wins in the game if b = b.
Definition 1: The CCA2-PV-R-LU-MA-ABE is indistinguishable against selective authority and access policy and statically chosen ciphertext attacks if for any probabilistic polynomial time adversary A, the advantage of breaking the security game defined above is at most a negligible function.
IV. CONCRETE SCHEME
Based on the system model and security model in section III, we construct a concrete scheme on prime-order bilinear groups that perform more efficiently than composite-order bilinear groups. The proposed scheme is as follows.
• Setup(1 λ ) → Param: This algorithm is run by the Cloud. It takes as input the system security parameter 1 λ . Firstly, it picks a prime order bilinear group generator G, and runs (G, p, g )
Then it picks random exponents α 0 , β 0 R ← − Z p as the master key, and computes PK 0 = (e(g, g) α 0 , g β 0 ) as the public key. For the identity and attribute are usually in a form of strings, it chooses a hash function H mapping identity GID to elements of G, and another hash function F mapping attributes to elements of G. Then it defines the attribute universe U and the authority universe U θ , and T : U → U θ is a publicly computable function mapping each attribute to a unique authority, which means that, for example, T maps the attribute ''att i @θ i '' to its relative authority ''θ i ''. It initializes a revocation list RL = ∅. Finally, it picks a Chameleon hash function H ch : {0, 1} * → U and runs the KeyGen ch ( 
The system global parameter Param is the input for all of the following algorithms and we omit it for simplicity.
• ASetup(θ) → (PK θ , SK θ ): This algorithm is run by the authority θ. It takes as input the global parameters Param and the index of the authority θ ∈ U θ \ {0}. It picks two random exponents α θ , β θ R ← − Z p , then publishes the public key PK θ = (e(g, g) α θ , g β θ ), and keeps the private key SK θ = (α θ , β θ ).
• KeyGen(GID, θ, att, SK θ ) → SK GID,att : This algorithm is run by the authority θ. It takes authority's private key SK θ , user's identity GID and user's attribute att ∈ U as input and outputs the user's private key SK GID,att . Firstly, it sets up a binary tree BT θ if BT θ has not been setup, in which each user with attribute T (att) = θ is assigned as a leaf node and it increases the height with users increasing. For each node N ∈ BT θ , it randomly picks {KN θ,N } R ← − Z p . Then authority θ randomly picks r R ← − Z p and computes K GID,att = g α θ H (GID) β θ F(att) r , K GID,att = g r . Finally, it outputs SK GID,att = (K GID,att , K GID,att , {KN θ,N } N ∈Path(GID) ), and gives SK GID,att to the user GID, then gives to the Fog (BT θ , {KN θ,N } N ∈Path(GID) ).
• KeyUp(BT θ , RL) → {KU θ,N }: This algorithm is run by the authority θ. It takes as input the revocation list RL and the binary tree BT θ . Firstly, it randomly picks
rithm is run by either the user GID or the Fog to generate the re-encryption key RK θ for all unrevoked user with attribute T (att) = θ. If Path(GID) ∩ KUNode(BT θ , RL) = ∅, it returns ⊥. Otherwise, it calculates N ∈ Path(GID) ∩ KUNode(BT θ , RL) and then it computes the re-encryption key
This algorithm is run by the data owner. It takes as input a message M , an access policy (A, δ) with A ∈ Z ×n p , and the public keys {PK θ } of the relative authorities, where θ = T (att). We defines a function ρ : [ ] → U θ as ρ(·) = T (δ(·)) to map rows to authorities. Then it randomly picks {C 1,x , C 2,x , C 3,x , C 4,x } x∈[0, ] , r ch ) as follows: 
If all of these equations hold, it means that the ciphertext is encrypted exactly by the attribute att and not tampered maliciously, and then it outputs True. Else it outputs False.
• ReEnc(C, RK att ) → C : This algorithm is run by the Fog. The Fog re-encrypts the ciphertext by comput-
. Then the re-encrypted ciphertext C would be stored securely on the Fog.
• Dec(C , RK θ , {SK GID,att }) → M / ⊥: This algorithm is run by the data visitor GID with attributes att. It firstly computes the original ciphertext C = C except that
Then it verifies the validity of the ciphertext with the Equation (1), Equation (2) and Equation (3) in the algorithm Verify (C, (A, δ) ). Let (A, δ) be the access policy of the ciphertext. If the algorithm Verify (C, (A, δ) ) outputs True, it computes:
Then it calculates a constants c x ∈ Z p such that
Finally, the data visitor computes: • Rev(GID, att, RL) → RL: This algorithm is run by each authority to revoke a certain attribute att from a user GID. It just adds this user's identity and revoked attribute into the revocation list RL.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The proposed CCA2-PV-R-LU-MA-ABE concrete scheme is constructed based on the conference paper [5] , and we add public-verifiable function to it. In this scheme, the executor runs Verify(C, (A, δ)) algorithm with publicly claimed ciphertext and attributes, which has no contribution to breaking the security of the scheme. Thus the security proof is almost the same as the earlier version, and we omit it due to the limit of space.
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In Fog Computing, efficiency is one of the most important consideration when we design security mechanism. For the scheme is constructed based on prime-order bilinear groups and the revocation is run on the Subset-Cover Revocation Framework, the efficiency should be impressive. However, to enhance the security from CPA to CCA2, we apply the Chameleon Hash function and use this hash value as an attribute to encrypt a part of ciphertext, which brings some sacrifice of efficiency. Thus we analyze the efficiency of our scheme, and compare this scheme with Rouselakis-Waters statically-secure LU-MA-ABE scheme. In order to make the contrast more comprehensive, we compare both of the schemes in theoretical method and in experimental method.
A. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
We compare the performance of our CCA2-PV-R-LU-MA-ABE scheme with Rouselakis-Waters statically-secure LU-MA-ABE scheme in Table 2 . As shown in Table 2 , for prime-order groups G and G T , we denote τ e as one exponent operation time, τ m as one multiplication operation, τ p as one pairing operation time, and τ h as one Chameleon hash operation time. In this table, the secret key SK GID,|S| is associated with the attribute set S with k = |S| and the node set Path(GID) with d = |Path(GID)|. The ciphertext C (A,ρ) is associated with the LSSS-policy (A, ρ) with A ∈ Z ×n p . In the comparisons, the extra length of secret key comes from key revocation function, which is equal to d × k where d is logarithm of the total number of users in the authority. The extra length of ciphertext comes from the part encrypted by Chameleon hash value, which is equal to 4 + |r ch |, and the size can be seen as insignificant. The time of key generation is the same in both scheme. The extra time of encryption comes from the execution of Chameleon hash of ciphertext and a part of ciphertext encrypted by this Chameleon hash value. The extra time of decryption in our scheme is only one exponential operation because of the re-encrypted ciphertext should be decrypted by the update key from key revocation function. Through the overall theoretical comparison, the additional overhead for CCA2 security and revocation function is considerable low.
B. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
We implement our proposed CCA2-PV-R-LU-MA-ABE scheme and the Rouselakis-Waters Statically-secure LU-MA-ABE with the Java Pairing-Based Cryptography Library (JPBC) [44] to evaluate and compare their performances. The experiment is run on 3.7GHz Inter Xeon E5-1620 v2 platform with 16GB RAM running 64-bit Windows 10 Professional operation system. The elliptic curve is Type A with y 2 = x 3 + x for Tate symmetric pairings, and the primes are 512-bit large randomly picked by the system. We run both of the schemes for 100 rounds and calculate the average execution time they take, where the number of attributes is ranging from 1 to 50. Finally, we draw the graphs in figure 3 .
We separately demonstrate Setup and ASetup time in Figure 3a , KeyGen time in Figure 3b , Encryption time in Figure 3c , and Decryption time in Figure 3d . It can be seen that the performance of our IND-sAA-sCCA2 secure R-LU-MA-ABE scheme is almost the same as the performance of Rouselakis-Waters Statically-secure LU-MA-ABE. In Figure 3a , the setup time difference between both schemes mainly comes from initialization of Chameleon hash function. In Figure 3b , our scheme only picks more random elements than the Rouselakis-Waters ABE, and thus the curves almost coincide. In Figure 3c , our scheme encrypts one part of ciphertext, and thus the time difference is almost fixed, while with the increase of the attribute number, the proportion of time difference decreases. Figure 3d displays Decryption time, where the verification time is also included, and if the public verification process is executed by the Fogs, the Decryption time of the both schemes is almost the same too. Thus the experimental verification shows that the additional overhead for CCA2 security is considerable low.
VII. FUTURE IMPLEMENTATION ON BLOCKCHAIN
The proposed system allows decentralized authorization and public verification, and Blockchain has some same respects VOLUME 7, 2019 with Fog Computing. Thus this system can also be utilized in blockchain to support flexible data access control, especially in blockchain-based distributed storage system. Files can be encrypted with this system before updating to blockchain, and the file owner should declare the access attributes. Miners and nodes in blockchain can verify the validity of the updated files with the public verification algorithm, and only the valid files can be stored. Data visitor can generate its private keys from different distributed authorities based on the attributes. And the data visitor can search the declared attributes of all files and download the attribute-matching files that it can access to. This system is CCA2 secure to ensure security of the files, and it can be executed efficiently.
VIII. CONCLUSION
An efficient CCA2 secure publicly-verifiable revocable large-universe multi-authority CP-ABE system for Fog Computing was defined in this paper, and we constructed a concrete scheme based on prime-order bilinear groups, which has superior performance than composite-order bilinear groups. Then we proved this scheme is IND-sAA-sCCA2 secure under the (q+1)-DPBDHE2 assumption. We analyzed the performance of this scheme with both theoretical calculation and experimental verification methods, and this scheme performs a remarkable efficiency. Thus the proposed scheme is secure and efficient enough to serve the practical Fog Computing. This system achieves flexible and publicly-verifiable access control, and it will have a wide range of application scenarios in the future.
